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Valdes & Barbara A. Kohl On Feb. 25, 1990, presidential elections took place in Nicaragua, the
end result of the most heavily scrutinized electoral exercise on record. Incumbent Daniel Ortega
was defeated after having served as president for over 10 years. Installed in 1979, Ortega headed
a revolutionary movement which ousted a corrupt and brutal family dictatorship that had ruled
for decades. Washington and world public opinion insist that Nicaragua's Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) hand over total control of the army and police to the new government
under Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Of course. The US launched a military invasion in Panama
with the objective, among others, of ending the autonomy of the military forces headed by Gen.
Manuel Antonio Noriega. Democracy in Panama, it was argued, could flourish only in the absence of
military tutelage. Nicaragua and Panama are two recent examples of an articulated US foreign policy
preference for civilian control over military forces in the interest of establishing and maintaining
democracy. Meanwhile, a double standard is apparent in the lack of concern about military
involvement in politics elsewhere in Latin America, e.g., Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, and most
US Central American allies. Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo must carefully choose policies
and orders in the areas of economy, politics and security for fear of upsetting military leaders.
Disgruntled soldiers have attempted to get rid of him at least twice. The presidents of Honduras
and El Salvador are fully aware of the limits of "civilian rule." Army commanders in all three
countries are consulted on nearly everything, and are heavily involved in non-military government
enterprises and administration and, incidentally, in profit-making. The most transparent case of
the double standard in recent months, however, is Chile. In an October 1988 plebiscite, Chileans
"said no" to eight more years of military rule, paving the way for the election of a civilian president
on Dec. 14, 1989. Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin obtained 55% of the vote. In this process,
Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who overthrew a democratically elected civilian government in 1973, was
finally removed from the presidency. On March 11, Aylwin received the presidential sash from
Gen. Pinochet, but not control of the armed forces. Pinochet has announced that he will remain
army commander-in-chief until 1997, over Aylwin's formal and informal requests for his retirement,
the objections of the multi-party coalition which supported Aylwin in the election campaign, and
even the misgivings of a few military officers. Pinochet also informed Aylwin that he would not take
orders from the new defense minister, since civilians know little of military matters. Instead, said
Pinochet, he will deal directly with Aylwin. The new president and his cabinet confront a congress
comprised of a large number of members appointed by the military junta, rather than elected
by Chileans. Of 325 city mayors, 309 were appointed by the junta. A separate national security
council controlled by the military and the police retains power to veto any congressional legislation
including constitutional amendments. According to Chilean daily La Epoca (03/04/90), Pinochet
has created a parallel structure within the armed forces to monitor all government ministries.
The military intelligence apparatus (CNI), feared by Chileans, and denounced by foreign and
domestic human rights organizations for many years, was finally abolished by edict of the military
junta. But the CNI was eliminated only as a separate agency. It is now an appendage of the army
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under Pinochet. Before vacating the presidential palace, Pinochet and his junta in the capacity
of legislature drafted a series of laws that limit the new government's ability to direct economic
and social programs. For instance, the Aylwin administration cannot reduce the military budget
below a set minimum. The junta approved legislation implementing the rapid privatization of staterun banks and other enterprises, regulating the education and justice system, and prohibiting the
new president and cabinet members from selecting their own personal assistants. [See Chronicle,
01/18/90, 02/08/90, 02/13/90, 03/13/90 for coverage of actions by the outgoing military regime
and discussion of limits placed on civilian government.] Civilian presidents have been elected
in several Latin American countries after many years of direct military rule. They appear to be
part of a massive shift toward democracy, but in many cases, power remains in the hands of the
military. Nicaragua may turn out to be an exception, result of pressure by Washington and other
governments on the Sandinistas to relinquish control of the armed forces. The same interest and
effort have clearly been absent in the case of Chile. Why the double standard? Could it be that US
foreign policymakers become exorcised about civilian control of the military only when the military
in question tends to be populist, revolutionary, concerned with income and wealth distribution, and
defender of natural resources for the benefit of the majority of nationals? Or when the maximum
leader of the military in question becomes unpredictable and unreliable in terms of supporting
US "security interests"? Such policies are not lost on Latin Americans, and do not contribute to a
genuine politics of democracy in the hemisphere.

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 2

